Marquette Law Review
Volume 96
Issue 1 Fall 2012

Article 4

Hallows Lecture: Barnette, Frankfurter, and Judicial
Review
Jeffrey S. Sutton

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Jeffrey S. Sutton, Hallows Lecture: Barnette, Frankfurter, and Judicial Review, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 133 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol96/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

09 - JUDGE SUTTON MARQ L REV DRAFT 13NOV12 CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE)

12/28/2012 11:00 AM

HALLOWS LECTURE
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
FEBRUARY 28, 2012

BARNETTE, FRANKFURTER, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW
JEFFREY S. SUTTON

*

1

West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, as every first-year law
student learns, is the flag-salute case. It is a tale of two cases, not one.
For the story must take account of the Supreme Court’s astonishing
about-face: The Court rejected a challenge to compelled flag salutes in
2
1940, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, before embracing the
identical claim in Barnette, only three years later.
But first this is a story about people, about two American families,
the Gobitas and Barnett families. When people lend their names to
landmark cases, the credit is fleeting, save for the lingering acclaim that
goes with attaching the family name to the constitutional principle for
3
which the case stands. Not only did time soon forget the sufferings of
the Gobitas and Barnett families, but the Court added the indignity of
misspelling their names, forever linking the principle against compelled
4
speech to families (or at least names) that do not exist. Although it
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. This article is an edited version of
Marquette University Law School’s 2012 Hallows Lecture. The lecture annually remembers
E. Harold Hallows, who served on the Wisconsin Supreme Court from 1958 to 1974 (and as
chief justice during the last six of those years) and who for almost three previous decades was
a lawyer in Milwaukee and a professor of law at Marquette University.
1. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2. 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940).
3. Cf. Peter D. Baird, Legal Lore: Miranda Memories, LITIGATION, Winter 1990, at 43,
46 (discussing Ernesto Miranda’s difficulties after the landmark case bearing his name and his
eventual death in obscurity).
4. See SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 19 (2000); see also Richard
Danzig, Justice Frankfurter’s Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases: Blending Logic and
Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REV. 675, 678–79 (1984) (reflecting
on the spelling mistake).
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would be difficult to conclude that both cases were wrongly decided, I
5
must start by acknowledging that both were wrongly captioned.
As for the two families, let’s begin with the Gobitas clan—spelled
with an a, not with two i’s. Walter Gobitas held a common job and
practiced an uncommon religion. He owned a local grocery store in a
Pennsylvania town known as Minersville, a community indeed filled
6
with its share of miners, and raised six children with his wife, Ruth.
The Minersville school board required all teachers and children to
pledge allegiance to the American flag at the beginning of each school
7
day. The pledge was not a new idea. It started in 1892 as a patriotic
way to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Columbus’s discovery of
8
America.
Congress declared the day a national holiday (hence
Columbus Day) and eventually codified the pledge, with these familiar
words: “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America
and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation indivisible, with
9
liberty and justice for all.” Congress would not add the words “under
10
God” until 1954.
The pledge, as initially conceived, was both verbal and physical. As
the students recited the words, the exercise required them to extend
11
their right hand from their heart outward and up toward the flag.
By the 1930s, this ceremony posed a problem for Jehovah’s
Witnesses, an evangelical Christian faith started in Pennsylvania in the
12
1800s. In 1935, the leader of the Witnesses, Joseph Rutherford, gave a
speech at the Witnesses’ national convention, encouraging Witnesses
13
not to participate in flag-salute ceremonies. As he saw it, the Bible is
14
“the Word of God” and “is the supreme authority.” Pledging fealty to
anything but God—whether the object be a country, a leader, or a
15
secular symbol—violated the Commandments.

5.
6.
7.
8.

See PETERS, supra note 4, at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591.
RICHARD J. ELLIS, TO THE FLAG: THE UNLIKELY HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF
ALLEGIANCE 19 (2005).
9. Act of June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-623, § 7, 56 Stat. 377, 380.
10. Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249.
11. § 7, 56 Stat. at 380; see also PETERS, supra note 4, at 25 (discussing this “militarystyle salute” given during the pledge).
12. PETERS, supra note 4, at 28–29.
13. Id. at 25.
14. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591(1940).
15. PETERS, supra note 4, at 25–26.
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Consistent with Rutherford’s teachings, the Gobitas children chose
not to participate in the flag-salute ceremony required by the
16
Minersville school board.
The school board reacted by expelling
17
Lillian Gobitas (age twelve) and her brother, William (ten). The father
sued the school board, its members, and the superintendent in federal
18
19
20
district court. The district court and the Third Circuit granted the
Gobitas family relief, invoking the free-exercise guarantee of the First
Amendment (together with the Fourteenth), and permitted the children
to return to school.
The Supreme Court was another matter. All nine Justices initially
voted to reject the claim after oral argument, with just Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Felix Frankfurter explaining their
21
thinking in any detail at the Justices’ conference.
Frankfurter
circulated an opinion for the Court; just three days before its release,
22
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone circulated a dissent. No one else joined the
Stone dissent. By an 8–1 vote, the Court thus upheld compelled flag
salutes.
The Gobitis decision caused problems for the Gobitas family—and
worse problems for other Jehovah’s Witnesses across the country. As
Shawn Francis Peters details in his excellent book, Judging Jehovah’s
Witnesses, many Minersville residents led a boycott of the Gobitas
23
grocery store. Thanks to the willingness of the state police to stand
24
guard, no violence or destruction of the store resulted. After several
25
months, business for the most part returned to normal.
The same was not true for Jehovah’s Witnesses in other
communities. As school boards across the country enacted mandatory
26
flag-salute requirements, Witnesses were put to the choice of sending
their children to the local public schools and compromising their
religious beliefs, or sending them to private schools.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591.
PETERS, supra note 4, at 37–39.
Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 24 F. Supp. 271, 272 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939).
PETERS, supra note 4, at 51–52.
Id. at 52, 65, 237.
Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
See id. at 164–65.
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Making matters more difficult for Witnesses was the first peacetime
draft in American history, launched in September 1940 and ramped up
27
after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Male Witnesses
sought exemptions from conscription on the ground that proselytizing
was a central tenet of the faith and a full-time job, leaving no time for
28
war efforts.
While the draft exempted conscientious objectors, it
exempted them only from combat, not from other war-related services,
29
which Witnesses claimed to have no time to perform. The Witnesses’
response to conscription did not sit well with draft boards across the
country. Over the course of World War II, the government imprisoned
30
10,000 men who resisted conscription. Forty percent of them were
31
Witnesses.
The Witnesses’ resistance to the flag salute and to the wartime draft,
combined with the Supreme Court’s stamp of constitutionality on
compelled flag salutes in Gobitis, unleashed a wave of persecution with
few rivals in American history. Gobitis was decided on June 3, 1940. In
the first three weeks after the decision, there were hundreds of attacks
32
against Witnesses across the country. Between May and October 1940,
the American Civil Liberties Union reported to the Justice Department,
vigilantes attacked 1,488 Witnesses in 335 communities, covering all but
33
four states in the country.
34
Local law enforcement often did little to deter the attacks. When a
reporter asked one sheriff why, he answered, “They’re traitors—the
35
Supreme Court says so. Ain’t you heard?”
From the outset, Gobitis was not a popular decision in the press or
the legal academy. Some 170 newspapers editorialized against it, and
36
few favored it.
The New Republic and the ACLU criticized the
decision fiercely—a noteworthy development because Frankfurter, the
37
author of Gobitis, had helped to found both organizations. How, they
thought, could one of their own, one of the great civil libertarians of the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, 54 Stat. 885.
See PETERS, supra note 4, at 260–61.
See id.
Id. at 262.
Id.
See id. at 72–95 (discussing a series of these attacks against the Witnesses).
Id. at 85 (and sources cited).
Id. at 73.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 69.
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day, the defender of Sacco and Vanzetti, write such a decision?
The ACLU’s director at the time, Roger Baldwin, wrote a letter to
Joseph Rutherford, the Witnesses’ leader, promising to help limit or
overrule the decision, noting his “shock” that the Court had swept
“aside the traditional right of religious conscience in favor of a
38
compulsory conformity to a patriotic ritual.” “The language” of the
decision, he added, “reflects something of the intolerant temper of the
39
moment.”
The New Republic was tougher. It observed that the “country is now
in the grip of war hysteria,” creating the risk “of adopting Hitler’s
40
philosophy in the effort to oppose Hitler’s legions.”
As Peters
recounts, the magazine even compared the decision to one by a German
court punishing Witnesses who refused to honor the Nazi salute, saying
it was “sure that the majority members of our Court who concurred in
the Frankfurter decision would be embarrassed to know that their
41
attitude was in substance the same as that of the German tribunal.”
Ouch.

School children in Connecticut say the Pledge of Allegiance in 1942. Library of
Congress.

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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That brings us to the second family, the Barnett family—whose
42
name ends with a t, not with an e. Inspired by the Gobitis decision and
perhaps by the bombing of Pearl Harbor one month earlier, the West
Virginia Board of Education in January 1942 required all teachers and
students in all West Virginia schools to participate in flag-salute
43
ceremonies. “[R]efusal to salute the Flag,” the state board said, would
“be regarded as an act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with
44
accordingly.”
The “accordingly” was expulsion, with readmission
45
In the
permitted only after the student agreed to salute the flag.
interim, the student would be treated as “unlawfully absent” and as a
delinquent, permitting the state to prosecute the parents for truancy and
46
to send the children to reformatories for juvenile delinquents. The
only way out of this bind was for the affected families to send their
47
children to private schools, a remedy that most could not afford.
Marie and Gathie Barnett, age nine and eleven, attended Slip Hill
48
Grade School, an elementary school outside Charleston, West Virginia.
The school was neither big nor wealthy. Until the war, indeed, it put up
49
only a picture of a flag, not the real thing. In the spring of 1942, the
principal of the school stopped Marie and Gathie and asked whether
50
they would recite the pledge and salute the flag that day. In saying
“no,” they explained that “pledging allegiance to a flag was an act of
worship, and we could not worship anyone or anything but our God
51
52
Jehovah.” The principal sent them home.
42. See Gregory L. Peterson et al., Recollections of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755, 792 (2007).
43. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 629.
46. Id. at 629–30. The Barnett children would avoid truancy charges by presenting
themselves at school each morning, only to have the principal send them home. Peterson et
al., supra note 42, at 771.
47. See Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 24 F. Supp. 271, 273 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (calculating
the cost of tuition for 1935–1938 for the two Gobitas children as totaling in excess of $1,400).
The private school—Jones Kingdom School—that the Gobitas children began attending was
an old farmhouse, renovated by a sympathetic individual and serving forty students in grades
one through eight. PETERS, supra note 4, at 43. Walter Gobitas modified a delivery truck
into a bus so that the children could all ride together for the daily one-hour commute. Id. at
44–45.
48. Peterson et al., supra note 42, at 768.
49. See DAN SELIGMAN, FROM GOBITIS TO BARNETTE: A PRIMER 2 (2006); Peterson
et al., supra note 42, at 768.
50. Peterson et al., supra note 42, at 770.
51. SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 1.
52. Peterson et al., supra note 42, at 769.
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Led by Hayden Covington, the same lawyer who had worked on the
Gobitis case, the Barnetts sought an injunction in federal court against
enforcement of the law. Notwithstanding the 8–1 Gobitis decision, a
three-judge court unanimously granted the injunction in favor of the
53
parents. And notwithstanding the Gobitis decision, the West Virginia
Board of Education did not ask for a stay pending its appeal to the U.S.
54
55
Supreme Court. Marie and Gathie Barnett returned to school.
Later that school year, the Supreme Court returned to its senses. On
June 14, 1943—Flag Day, as it happened—the Court held that
compelled flag salutes could not be reconciled with the free-speech
56
requirements of the First Amendment.
The 6–3 majority opinion was authored by one of the Court’s new
appointees, Robert H. Jackson. Jackson was the last individual
appointed to the Supreme Court who did not graduate from law
57
school. He attended Albany Law School for a year and never attended
58
college. In spite of all this (or, horror of horrors, perhaps because of
it), his Barnette opinion is a gem. It explains how compelled speech
59
cannot be reconciled with “free” speech. And it contains one of the
most memorable lines in American constitutional history: “If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
60
confess by word or act their faith therein.”
Justice Frankfurter was not happy. Instead of making a tactical
retreat, he doubled down on his position in Gobitis. His method was a
form of confession and avoidance. He confessed to agreeing with the
underlying policy of the Court’s opinion—that it is not the government’s
job to coerce faith in the country. But he avoided the conclusion that
might flow from that premise by reminding the majority of the
progressive critique of conservative jurists over the preceding thirty-plus
years—that the Justices had no business importing their preferred
policies into the Constitution. The first five sentences of his opinion
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 255 (S.D. W. Va. 1942).
PETERS, supra note 4, at 247.
Id. at 248.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 624, 642 (1943).
NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 46 (2010).
58. Id. at 42–43.
59. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
60. Id.
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capture the point, invoking the familiarity of members of his own faith
(Judaism) with religious persecution:
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted
minority in history is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms
guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely personal
attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with
the general libertarian views in the Court’s opinion, representing
as they do the thought and action of a lifetime. But as judges we
are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic. We
owe equal attachment to the Constitution and are equally bound
by our judicial obligations whether we derive our citizenship
from the earliest or the latest immigrants to these shores. As a
member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private
notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I
may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their
61
disregard.
So ends the Barnette story, which prompts seven loosely connected
observations.
First, lost in every discussion of Barnette and Gobitis is a reality that
only a lower-court judge would catch. In all three cases, the lower
courts were ultimately vindicated, whether it was the (initially reversed)
district court and the court of appeals in Gobitis or the (affirmed) threejudge court in Barnette. The Constitution requires one Supreme Court
and permits Congress in its discretion to create “inferior” federal courts,
62
as the Constitution painfully puts it. One lesson from the Barnette
story, I should like to think, is that “inferior” courts are not necessarily
populated by inferior judges.
Second, the Jehovah’s Witnesses played a remarkable role in
developing First Amendment law—in Barnette and elsewhere. The
primary lawyer for the Witnesses, Hayden Covington, who worked on
the Gobitis brief and argued Barnette, led an effort resulting in some
twenty-three Supreme Court cases between 1938 and 1946 on behalf of
63
Witnesses. The Witnesses’ objection to the flag salute, their zeal in
spreading their faith, their willingness to proceed in the most hostile
environments, and their omnipresent distribution of pamphlets laid the
groundwork for much of what we now take for granted as first premises
of First Amendment law. Consider these other landmark Witness
61. Id. at 646–47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
63. See PETERS, supra note 4, at 12–13.
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decisions from the Supreme Court:


64

Lovell v. City of Griffin, a 1938 decision invalidating, as a
violation of the free-speech and free-press guarantees of the
First Amendment, a city ordinance that banned the distribution
of printed literature without a permit;


65

Cantwell v. Connecticut, a 1940 decision incorporating the
free-exercise clause against the states and invalidating a state
requirement that individuals obtain a permit before soliciting
religious contributions;
66



Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
a 1942 decision
establishing the fighting-words doctrine in affirming the
conviction of a Witness who called a city marshal “a damned
Fascist”;
67



Murdock v. Pennsylvania, a 1943 decision invalidating a
municipal ordinance that required a permit (at a cost of seven
dollars per week) to distribute or sell literature door-to-door;
and


68

Prince v. Massachusetts, a 1944 decision upholding, against
a free-exercise challenge, a state law that prohibited children
from selling pamphlets door-to-door.
In this era, it would have been difficult to be a Witness and not be a
First Amendment scholar. Without the Jehovah’s Witnesses, it is likely
that First Amendment law would not be the same, and it is a certainty
that it would have taken a different path.
Third, the speed with which the Court changed its mind between
Gobitis and Barnette is startling and unprecedented. What is most
striking about Barnette, and to my knowledge without counterpart in
American constitutional history, is the shift in the number of votes in
just three years. What starts as an 8–1 ruling against the First
Amendment claim becomes a 6–3 ruling in favor of it. That is a shift of
five votes in just three years, almost two lost votes per year.
From the vantage point of 2012, it is easy to second-guess the Gobitis
majority—indeed, to wonder what it was thinking. How could the Court
conclude that, in the midst of an epic struggle against fascism, it was a
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

303 U.S. 444 (1938).
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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good idea to expel from school twelve-year-old (and younger) children,
whose only offense was to stand respectfully and silently as the pledge
was recited? The only thing more head-snapping would be a law
compelling salutes to the First Amendment before civics class.
A few initial explanations are in order. At the time, any First
Amendment claim against a state was a relative novelty, as the freespeech clause had been incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment only in 1925—and the free-exercise clause had
69
been incorporated just fourteen days before Gobitis.
At the time,
Justice Frankfurter also was perceived as a leading, if not the leading,
progressive thinker on constitutional law, and his vote in Gobitis was
consistent with his years of advocacy against using the Constitution as a
70
means of trumping the winners of the policy debates of the day. So, in
1940, with Chief Justice Hughes, the Court’s leading conservative, and
Justice Frankfurter, the leading liberal, aligned against the claim, the
Gobitas family faced a long and steep climb.
The war also may explain things. Remember that Gobitis was
handed down just months after the fall of France in World War II,
perhaps unduly sensitizing the Court to the patriotism that likely would
71
be called upon soon to sustain America’s entry into the war. Indeed,
within the Court, Frankfurter’s opinion was called the “Fall-of-France”
72
opinion. In a letter to Justice Stone on May 27, 1940, Frankfurter
indicated that the war had affected his position and suggested that it
73
should affect Stone’s.
Wartime circumstances, Frankfurter wrote,
required the Court to make the delicate “adjustment between
legislatively allowable pursuit of national security and the right to stand
74
on individual idiosyncra[s]ies.”
Oddly enough, just as the war may explain the thinking of the
Gobitis majority, it may do the same for the Barnette majority. How,
Jackson thought, could the country use the fight against fascism as a
75
basis for compelling unwilling children to pledge allegiance to the flag?
It is sometimes said that the law sleeps during war. Perhaps the law
69. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940).
70. PETERS, supra note 4, at 55–56.
71. See id. at 53–54. See generally Richard Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in
Felix Frankfurter’s First Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 257.
72. PETERS, supra note 4, at 65.
73. Id. at 54–55.
74. Id. at 55.
75. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–41 (1943).
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slept through Gobitis but woke up in time for Barnette.
The criticism of Gobitis and the impact of the decision on Witness
persecutions also help to explain the rapid switch in votes. The Gobitis–
Barnette story demonstrates that flawed judicial restraint is occasionally
just as dangerous as flawed judicial intervention.
Consider the two possibilities. If forced to generalize, I would
suggest that, in most close constitutional cases, the Court should err on
the side of deference to the elected branches—on the side of judicial
restraint. More often than not, the Court poses a greater risk to the
country by invalidating laws than by letting the political processes
oversee them. The American people are more likely to accept the
resolution of difficult social and economic issues when they have a say in
the matter. While democracy is flexible, judicial review is not. While
democracy is designed to adjust to new circumstances, judicial review
generally is not. And while all legislative and judicial decisions will have
unintended (and unknown) consequences, the elected branches are far
better equipped to respond to them than are life-tenured judges. In
close cases, it thus makes sense for courts to err on the side of
democracy—to allow the elected branches of government to monitor,
adjust to, and ultimately solve, as best they can, difficult social and
economic problems.
Yet Gobitis illustrates the risk of generalization. One can fairly
make the case that Gobitis took a bad situation (needless persecution of
Jehovah’s Witnesses) and through inaction made it worse (by prompting
increased violence against Witnesses). As Covington, the Barnetts’
lawyer, argued with only some hyperbole, Gobitis facilitated a “civil war
76
against the Jehovah’s Witnesses.” Judges, like doctors, should first be
mindful that they do no harm—that they do not make a bad situation
worse. The Court did not heed this lesson in Gobitis, which is surely one
of the reasons the Court overruled it so quickly. Every now and then
77
there can be harm in inaction, something that Plessy v. Ferguson
78
demonstrated before Gobitis and that Korematsu v. United States
reaffirmed after it.
Fourth, a discerning reader might wonder why Chief Justice Stone
assigned the Barnette opinion to Justice Jackson. Stone had written the
solo dissent in Gobitis. Jackson was a newcomer to the Court. And of
course Stone by then was the Chief Justice, the first among equals on
76. PETERS, supra note 4, at 249.
77. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
78. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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the Court—and the first among non-equals when it comes to opinion
assignments. I do not know the answer, but I have my suspicions.
Justice Jackson was the weakest link in the majority. As time would
show, Jackson’s inclinations about judicial review were closer to
79
Frankfurter’s than to Stone’s. No less importantly, the majority faced a
doctrinal dispute that continues to this day. Was Barnette (as well as
cases like it) about religious liberties or about free speech? To Stone
80
and others, Barnette was a case about the free exercise of religion. Yet
81
to Jackson, Barnette was a case about compelled speech. He could not
understand why anyone should be required to salute the flag, whether
82
over faith-based objections or something else. If the Barnette principle
applied to spiritual and secular objections to the pledge, it must be a
free-speech case. To this day, the Supreme Court struggles with
whether to review general laws that restrict speech and faith—such as
the pledge requirement—under the free-exercise clause or the free83
speech clause.
Fifth, the turnaround from Gobitis to Barnette occurred after
President Franklin D. Roosevelt remade the Court with Democratic
appointees. By 1943, only two members of the Court had not been
84
appointed by FDR, and both were reasonably congenial to his policies.
Chief Justice Stone may not have been appointed to the Court by FDR,
85
but FDR elevated him to the Chief Justiceship. And Justice Owen
Roberts had voted several times to uphold New Deal programs, casting
(as some have characterized it) the fabled switch-in-time vote that
86
preserved nine.
With this cast of seemingly like-minded Justices, one might have
79. See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Roosevelt Court: The Liberals Conquer (1937–
1941) and Divide (1941–1946), 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 491, 535–36 (1983) tbls.6–8
(showing the disagreement rates between and among the Justices).
80. See, e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
81. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943).
82. Id.
83. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections:
Why Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 431, 476–77 (2006).
84. See Galloway, supra note 79, at 508–15.
85. FELDMAN, supra note 57, at 203.
86. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a
Washington minimum wage law that fixed minimum wages for women and minors); see also
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 84–97 (1998) (casting doubt on the conventional version of
the “switch in time”).
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expected a unified Supreme Court. It did not turn out that way. They
remained unified, it is true, in permitting virtually unlimited exercises of
87
the commerce power by Congress, and in agreeing that the Court
88
should not second-guess state and federal economic regulations. But
when it came to civil liberties, unanimity disappeared.
A little history helps to explain why. Odd though it may sound to
modern ears, the first promoters of frequent and aggressive judicial
review were conservatives. In the first four decades of the twentieth
century, a conservative-dominated Supreme Court invoked liberty of
contract and the limited and enumerated basis of congressional power to
invalidate hundreds of local, state, and federal laws.
Progressives responded to these decisions with increasing skepticism
over the utility and legitimacy of judicial review. The leading judicial
progressives of the day—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Learned Hand,
Louis D. Brandeis, Frankfurter—all decried what they perceived as an
89
activist Court.
Once FDR had remade the Court with New Dealers, such as Hugo
L. Black and William O. Douglas, and progressives, such as Frankfurter,
the question arose as to which way the new Court would go. Should the
Justices stand by the Holmesian view of judicial restraint? Or should
they treat judicial review differently depending on the type of
constitutional guarantee at issue?
90
With footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co. in
1938 and other decisions, then-Justice Stone, who would become the
author of the lone dissent in Gobitis, proposed a way to retain a
progressive critique of conservative judicial activism but permit some
liberal judicial activism—by distinguishing between economic rights on
91
the one hand and civil liberties on the other. In addition to Stone,
many of the FDR appointees—not just Black and Douglas, but Frank
Murphy and Wiley B. Rutledge also—embraced this approach.
Frankfurter was an exception, and so usually was Justice Jackson.
Noah Feldman put the point in his book Scorpions this way:

87. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that wheat grown by a
farmer on private land for his own household’s consumption was properly a subject for
regulation by the Congress under the Commerce Clause).
88. See Galloway, supra note 79, at 528.
89. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV.
519, 526–31, 542 (2012) (summarizing these individuals’ approaches to judicial review).
90. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
91. See id. at 152–53 n.4.
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As the other liberals on the Court shifted ground, Frankfurter—
to his astonishment—found himself transformed into a
conservative. Frankfurter’s critics, then and later, have tried to
explain how it could be that the country’s best-known liberal
became its leading judicial conservative. But the source of the
change was not Frankfurter, whose constitutional philosophy
remained remarkably consistent throughout his career. It was
the rest of liberalism that abandoned him and moved on once
judicial restraint was no longer a useful tool to advance liberal
92
objectives.
Gobitis is the seed, and Barnette the first fruit, of that division.
To this day, a struggle lingers over what a progressive or liberal
jurisprudence should look like. Judicial conservatives, you might say,
face a similar dilemma. Many of today’s conservative Justices came of
age and defined themselves in opposition to what they perceived as an
unrestrained Warren Court. Now that they possess a majority, they
must decide what their theory of judicial review is and what it should be.
On top of all this, as Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook reminds us,
even a Court filled with nine like-minded individuals, indeed nine
clones, eventually will splinter, whether along lines currently known or
93
yet to be imagined. The Stone Court is Exhibit A in proving the point,
as exemplified by the Gobitis–Barnette transformation.
Sixth, what of the possibility that Frankfurter was right in Gobitis?
The defense requires advocacy skills I do not possess. But a few points
complicate the picture.
To start, there was a chance that democracy would have solved the
problem. The Justice Department, it is true, was not helpful in
94
responding to the widespread vigilantism prompted by Gobitis. But
Congress responded. Between Gobitis and Barnette, Congress passed a
law establishing that standing silently at attention during the flag salute
95
is all that local governments could ask of their citizens. The law was
designed to preempt contrary local laws, and it was a law the Witnesses
96
were willing to live with. In Barnette, the Court had a chance to rely on
this law, but it did not.
In civil-liberties debates, moreover, it sometimes is worth asking this
92. FELDMAN, supra note 57, at 232.
93. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, at xxiv–xxv (2012).
94. PETERS, supra note 4, at 98, 113, 141.
95. Act of June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-623, § 7, 56 Stat. 377, 380.
96. PETERS, supra note 4, at 246.
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question: Would you rather live in a country in which a majority of a
nine-member Supreme Court protects the rights of dissenters or a
country in which a majority of its citizens do so? What, for example, is
more important to the protection of racial and religious minorities in
97
this country: Court decisions such as Brown or legislation such as the
98
Civil Rights Act of 1964? There is something to Frankfurter’s insight
that civil liberties are best protected when they become part of our
political culture and part of what we Americans do for each other, not
99
what the Supreme Court does for us. Every time the Court protects
the people from their own mistakes, it risks cheapening self-government
and undermining the polity’s capacity to steel itself against the next
misbegotten policy urge of the moment.
No one can fairly doubt that the laws at issue in Gobitis and Barnette
went against Frankfurter’s policy preferences. Before joining the Court,
100
he had devoted his career to protecting civil liberties.
Yet, as he
appreciated, no judicial philosophy is worth its salt if it does not hurt
from time to time, if it does not force the judge to rule against preferred
causes here and there. Frankfurter may have been wrong in Gobitis, but
he was right to bury his policy preferences. We do not have a judiciary
filled with blue-robed judges and red-robed judges, and Frankfurter was
surely correct to resist any suggestion to the contrary and indeed to
devote a professional lifetime to proving the point.
Consistency is a virtue, not a vice, when it comes to judicial
philosophy. Having spent his formative years as a lawyer and a
professor writing about and criticizing conservative Justices for imposing
their economic and political views on the country, Frankfurter was not
about to sanction the same conduct by a Court suddenly dominated by
liberals. He was rightly skeptical of the idea that constitutional rights
could be neatly divided into economic and liberty rights, and indeed
there is some support for this point in the modern era. Is it really true,
for example, that the Supreme Court’s 2005 Kelo v. City of New
101
London decision—permitting the use of eminent domain over a

97. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
98. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39–156 (1991) (considering relative
importance of Brown and the 1964 legislation in accomplishing desegregation); Michael
J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994)
(same).
99. Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 57, at 234 (elaborating on the view).
100. PETERS, supra note 4, at 56.
101. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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middle-class family’s home for the purpose of economic development by
a large corporation—is a case about property rights as opposed to
liberty rights? One may fairly disagree with Frankfurter’s application of
this philosophy in Gobitis, but it is hard to criticize his principled
consistency on the appropriate role of judicial review in American
government.
Frankfurter’s career calls to mind the story, likely apocryphal, of the
young lawyer who worked for an elected state court official. The lawyer
asked his boss how he handled matters that involved patrons who had
helped support him along the way, whether with financial contributions,
promotions, introductions, or other forms of support. The answer was
straightforward: “I must follow the law where it takes me, whether it
takes me in the direction of my political friends or not.” It came with
one caveat: “Of course, if it is a 50-50 call, I will side with my friends.”
That sounded reasonable enough, the young lawyer thought at the time.
But after looking back on several years of service with the elected
official, the young lawyer noticed a lot of 50-50 calls.
Say what you will about Justice Frankfurter, whether about his
Gobitis and Barnette opinions or about his tenure on the Court, but he
did not rationalize himself into making a lot of 50-50 calls. No political
party or interest group kept a halter on Frankfurter once he joined the
Court.
Seventh, Frankfurter nonetheless erred in Gobitis and should have
admitted as much in Barnette. Not even James Bradley Thayer and
Holmes, the two people most responsible for influencing Frankfurter’s
102
thinking, thought that judicial review had no role to play.
They
thought instead that the same restrained theory of judicial review
103
applies to all provisions of the Constitution—all rights, all structure.
And Frankfurter never took the position that there was no role for
judicial enforcement of civil liberties. He embraced the Holmes and
104
Brandeis dissent in Abrams v. United States, a 1919 case in which the
Court upheld criminal convictions for distributing antiwar literature. He
105
applauded the Court’s 1925 decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
which struck down a ban on private schooling. And he later joined—
and wrote—many such decisions as a Justice.

102. Posner, supra note 89, at 523, 526–27.
103. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 152 (1893).
104. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
105. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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Judges are not known for admitting their mistakes, and perhaps that
is a tradition that should change. In any given year, I sit on roughly ten
to twenty cases that reverse decisions of district court judges. Is it not
possible that appellate judges and justices have similar rates of error? It
of course helps that they sit in groups of three or nine, which diminishes
the risk of error. But that reality does not eliminate the risk.
As one Justice of the United States Supreme Court aptly put the
point: “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it
106
merely because it comes late.”
The appellate courts might be well
served to follow that advice. The source of this advice was Frankfurter
himself.
But even if Frankfurter did not learn the right lesson from Gobitis by
the time of Barnette, it is unfair to say that he remained rigidly opposed
to judicial review thereafter. He of course played a significant role in
107
the unanimous decision of Brown v. Board of Education.
So while
wisdom may indeed have come late for Frankfurter, it did come. One
wonders what would have become of Frankfurter’s legacy if it had come
earlier—if he had been the first member of the Court to realize the
misstep in Gobitis, if he had written the Barnette majority, if he had used
the opinion to explain how and why judicial restraint need not mean
judicial abdication, and if he had begun that opinion by talking about the
law’s and wisdom’s delays.
Let me close by mentioning a modest connection between Barnette
and Marquette Law School. Almost thirty years after Barnette, an
important religious-liberties case arose in Wisconsin: Wisconsin v.
108
Yoder. Amish families in Green County, about 100 miles southwest of
Milwaukee, challenged a Wisconsin law requiring all children to attend
school through the age of sixteen. The Amish faith required children to
stop attending school after the eighth grade. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that the state law violated the free-exercise rights of the families
109
The decision under review came from the
and struck it down.
Wisconsin Supreme Court. It is quite good. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s opinion begins: “No liberty guaranteed by our constitution is
more important or vital to our free society than is a religious liberty

106. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
107. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
108. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
109. Id. at 234–35.
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protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment.” It then
invokes Barnette, noting that, just as an exemption for Jehovah’s
Witnesses had no great impact on other citizens or on the policy
underlying the flag-salute law, so the same would be true with an
exemption for Amish children and parents from the compulsory111
education law. The author of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision,
quite fittingly, was one of Marquette’s own professors: Chief Justice
E. Harold Hallows, whom we remember with this lecture.

110. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 434, 182 N.W.2d 539, 540 (1971).
111. Id. at 442, 182 N.W.2d at 544.

